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Abstract
We develop a directed-technological-change model to address the issue
of the optimal patent system and investigate how the optimal patent sys-
tem in￿ uences the direction of technological change and the inequality of
wage, where patents are categorized as skill- and labor-complementary.
The major results are: (i) Finite patent breadth maximizes the social wel-
fare level; (ii) Optimal patent breadth increases with the amount of skilled
(unskilled) workers; (iii) Optimal patent protection is skill-biased, because
an increase in the amount of skilled workers increases the dynamic bene-
￿ts of the protection for skill-complementary patents via the economy of
scale of skill-complementary technology; (iv) Skill-biased patent protec-
tion skews inventions towards skills, thus increasing wage inequality; And,
(v) international trade leads to strong protection for skill-complementary
patents, hence increasing skill premia.
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11 Facts1
Over the decades, global patent systems have gone through three signi￿cant changes:
(1) Patent protection has been strengthened, in the sense that exclusive rights con-
ferred by the patent have been reinforced; (2) Patent protection has become skill-
biased, i.e., the protection for skill-complementary inventions is relatively strong;2
(3) Patent systems are now harmonized worldwide.
1.1 Strengthening Patent Rights
At the end of the 1970s, patent protection in the United States was widely thought
to be weak and ine⁄ective. This situation was essentially reversed in the 1980s, in
particular by the creation of Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in
1982, which was assigned patent litigation appeals from the federal district courts
(Ja⁄e, 1999). The establishment of CAFC was viewed as one of the most important
changes in the history of the U.S. patent system, and it has had a fundamental e⁄ect
on the patent litigation that was followed.
The creation of CAFC strengthens patent rights by increasing the success rate of
plainti⁄s who appeal. For example, between 1953 and 1978, appeals courts upheld
only 62 percent of district court decisions, but this percentage increased to 90 percent
between 1982 and 1990. In addition, while appeals courts reversed 12 percent of
district court verdicts that found patents to be invalid or not infringed between 1953
and 1980, that percentage increased to 28 percent between 1982 and 1990 (Koenig,
1980, Harmon, 1991). Furthermore, after CAFC was established, patentees were
able to request a preliminary injunction preventing an infringing ￿rm from using the
patented invention during the period of the trial (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1998).
In 1977, the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) was established by the European
Patent Convention (EPC). This was a milestone in the history of patent protection
in European countries. As a centralized patent o¢ ce, EPO is in charge of patent
application and grants on behalf of all contracting states. The fact that EPO in-
troduced examination and opposition proceedings in the system, in contrast to the
registration systems prevailing in most national Patent and Trademark O¢ ces, sig-
ni￿cantly reinforced the rights of patent holders in Europe and precluded patents
that would have been easily been overthrown in later courts (Martinez and Guellec,
2003).
1This section is based on Kortum and Lerner (1998), Ja⁄e (1999), Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), Martinez
and Guellec (2003), Merrill, Levin, and Myers (2004).
2We focus mainly on these two change phenomena as demonstrated in the United States, Europe and Japan.
2One of the most important reforms to the Japanese patent law system was in
1988, when Japan changed from the single-claim system to the multi-claim system.
The reform, one of the most signi￿cant in modern history, allowed patent applicants
to de￿ne the coverage of an invention with multiple claims that, could be either inde-
pendent of or dependent of other claims. Some patent experts argued that, after the
reform, the scope of invention covered by a single patent application equaled or even
exceeded that conferred by the U.S. and European patent systems. Therefore, this
reform substantially reinforced patent rights in Japan (Sakakibara and Branstetter,
2001).
According to Lerner (2001), who has studied 150 years of policy shifts as demon-
strated in 60 countries, policies aimed at strengthening patent protection worldwide
dominated since 1850.3 As Lerner explains, he examined the following ￿ve categories
of patent policies were examined: (1) range of subjects, (2) duration of patent, (3)
cost of patent, (4) limitation on patent, and, (5) measures of discrimination against
foreign patentees.
1.2 Skill-Biased Patent Protection
Before 1980 there was serious doubt as to whether biotechnology, software and busi-
ness methods could be patentability subject matter. Yet the number of patents for
them has been continuously increasing since they entered the realm of patentabil-
ity at the beginning of the 1980s in many developed countries. In Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (1980) the U.S. Supreme Court con￿rmed the eligibility of patenting
organisms with arti￿cially engineered genetic characteristics.4 In 2001, the United
States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) exhibited clearly that gene compo-
sitions are patentable. Although there are some di⁄erences between the patent law
in the United States and those in Europe and Japan, the general principles about
patentability of biotechnology are fundamentally the same. After steady growth in
the 1990s, in 2000 the number of biotechnology patent applications in OECD declined
from about 11,500 to 8,700 in 2006. The average share of biotechnology patents in
total patents, however, is about 6.5 percent, still a high ￿gure (Van Beuzekom and
Arundel, 2009).
Before 1980 computer programs were considered a mathematical algorithm and
hence deemed unpatentable.5 But in 1981, the US Supreme Court upheld the
3Moreover, relaxed limitations on antitrust and compulsory licensing also suggest strengthening patent protection.
4Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 65 L. Ed. 3d 144, available at 1980 U.S. LEXIS 112,
206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980). See Merrill, Levin, and Myers (2004) for further details.
5Although computer programs were unpatentable before 1980, there already existed few software patents.
3patentability of computer software, Diamond v. Diehr,6 because they produce a
technical e⁄ect in a machine. Later kinds of software that a⁄ect physical processes
were therefore also patentable. Table 1 reports that the number of software patents
granted per year and the share of software patents in total patents in the United
States have grown signi￿cantly, most notably, in 2002, when the share reached al-
most 15 percent.7 In 1993 the Japanese Patent O¢ ce (JPO) veri￿ed that software
inventions are patentable when they are concretely realized by using hardware re-
sources. On the other hand, the patent for software in Europe has been rejected,
as computer programs are explicitly excluded from patentability in Article 52 of the
EPC. However, some decisions made by the EPO Technical Board of Appeal vali-
dated patents for computer programs in Europe if the inventions are claimed with
reference to hardware, and if the inventive step makes a technical contribution to the
state of the art (Martinez and Guellec, 2003).
The CAFC upheld the patentability of business methods, as well as that of soft-
ware in a 1998 case, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group.8
This decision con￿rmed that business methods are patentable, and placed very few
limits on the patentability of software and ￿nancial service products (Ja⁄e, 1999).9
As a consequence, the number of business method patents has increased substantially
during the last decade. Table 2 shows that the number of business method patents
(USPTO Class 705) is 83 in 1988, 493 in 1998 and 1,692 in 2008, and that they
account for 1.1 percent of all utility patents in 1988, 3.7 percent in 1998 and 10.4
percent in 2008. Despite the limits put on the patentability of business methods, the
JPO started granting patents for them in 1997.10 As in the case of software, busi-
ness method patents are denied in European countries, due to Article 52 of the EPC.
However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the EPO awarded patents for most of
the business method inventions to which USPTO already granted patents (Martinez
and Guellec, 2003).
Clearly, most inventions of biotechnology, software and business methods are com-
plementing to skills, although some of them are used by unskilled workers. Therefore,
6Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, available at 1981 U.S. LEXIS 73, 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). See Merrill, Levin, and Myers (2004) for further details.
7This table is taken from Bessen and Hunt (2007).
8State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, available at 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16869,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See Merrill, Levin, and Myers (2004) for further details.
9Hall (2003) has found that thousands of business method patents have been granted at the USPTO between
1997 and 2001.
10For instance, JPO states that business methods are unpatentable when "the invention can be easily conceived
through combining publicly known means and methods by those having common knowledge on the business ￿eld
related to the patent application and technological knowledge on the computer technology" in its examination
guidelines published in 2000.
4the patentability of them suggests that patent protection is now more skill-biased
than over past decades. In fact, the greater breadth of skill-complementary patents
further demonstrates that patent protection is skill-biased. A famous example of
broader claims in biotechnology is when Johns Hopkins University was assigned a
patent that they claimed covered not only the My-10 antibody but also other anti-
bodies that bind to CD34, although that patent only showed e⁄ects with respect to
the My-10 antibody (Bar-Shalom, A. and R. Cook-Deegan, 2002).11 Owing to ￿ func-
tion claims￿in the ￿eld of software and business methods, that is, patents claiming
￿ problems￿rather than ￿ solutions￿ , any invention developed for that problem would
infringe the patent (Martinez and Guellec, 2003). Therefore, the breadth of patent
for software and business methods is substantially broad.
1.3 Harmonization of Patent Systems Worldwide
The Paris Convention is commonly remembered as the ￿rst step to international
harmonization of patent protection. And the establishment of the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967 made a further step towards the global
protection of patents, as did the WIPO￿ s administration of the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT) from 1970. However, since there were no e⁄ective measures for settling
disputes, the PCT was partly unenforceable, and large di⁄erences in patent policies
across countries were common until the mid-1990s.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, patent protection in some developing countries
proved inadequate. For instance, biotechnology, software and business methods were
widely considered unpatentable, and most importantly, procedures and resources for
the enforcement of patent laws were often inadequate at protecting patent holders
under even the existing weak standards of patent protection (Maskus, 2000). After
most developed countries expressed dissatisfaction with this situation, the improve-
ment of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection became one of the highest
priorities at the Uruguay Round of trade talks. As a result of the Uruguay Round,
the scope of the WTO was expanded to include an agreement on Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).
A major turning point in the global protection of intellectual property (patent
protection) was the enforcement of an agreement on TRIPs in 1995. TRIPs brings
intellectual property rights into the realm of the WTO dispute resolution procedures,
hence it is the ￿rst comprehensive and enforceable global pact set of rules covering
IPRs (Maskus, 2000). All WTO member countries have signed on to TRIPs and are
11For further details see Bar-Shalom, A. and R. Cook-Deegan (2002), Merrill, Levin, and Myers (2004).
5obligated to implement the most rudimentary rules for IPRs protection based on the
U.S. and EU practices. Moreover, when additional countries join the WTO, they
must meet the minimum standard required by TRIPs. Therefore, the implementa-
tion of the agreement on TRIPs has signi￿cantly increased harmonization of IPRs
protection worldwide.12
It is notable that pressure from the United States and the European Union played
a critical role in the international harmonization of IPRs protection (e.g., Maskus,
2000, Grossman and Lai, 2004).13 Widely publicized American negotiations and
threats in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in stronger IPRs legislation in South Korea,
Argentina, Brazil, Thailand, Taiwan, and China. Similarly, European Union ne-
gotiations and assistance advanced IPRs protection in Egypt and Turkey (Maskus,
2000).
These facts must be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, they suggest that we
should be aware of the changes in global patent systems over the past few decades.
In this paper, we propose a uni￿ed theory to answer the following questions: (1) Is
in￿nite patent breadth optimal in a directed-technological-change economy? (2) Why
does the protection for patents, in particular skill-complementary patents, increase?
(2) How does free trade a⁄ect the changes in patent systems? (3) What is the impact
of skill-biased patent protection on wage inequality? (4) How does the international
harmonization of patent systems place an impact on skill premia?
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the literature. In
Section 3, building on Acemoglu (1998, 2007, 2009) and the literature on an optimal
patent system, we present the basic model to explore the e⁄ect of patent protection
on the direction of technological change and wage inequality. In Section 4, we extend
the basic model to investigate the impact of international trade on skill-biased patent
protection and skill premia. Conclusions are found in Section 5.
2 Literature Review
Endogenous-growth literature has viewed invention as the engine of economic growth
(Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992).14 Ever
since Schumpeter (1942), we have known that it is necessary to provide inventors
with some form of market power to give them incentives to invent in the ￿rst place.
12Since TRIPs only sets out minimum standards with which countries must comply, it does not aim at complete
harmonization.
13Maskus (2000) has also pointed out that business interests are another important reason why some developing
countries, in particular advanced developing countries, increases IPRs protection.
14This literature is comprehensively reviewed by Romer (1994), etc.
6Consequently, two branches of literature have been devoted to the topic of optimal
patent protection, namely, that of the patent system that best solves the trade-o⁄
between providing enough incentives to invent ex ante and minimizing dead-weight
losses ex post. One branch of literature has studied optimal patent protection in a
partial equilibrium model (see, for example, Nordhaus, 1969, Scherer, 1972, Gilbert
and Shapiro, 1990, Klemperer, 1990, Gallini, 1992). Another branch of literature has
looked at the optimal patent system within a framework of general equilibrium (e.g.,
Judd, 1985, Goh and Oliver, 2002, Kwan and Lai, 2003, Iwaisako and Futagami,
2003, Horii and Iwaisako, 2007, Futagami and Iwaisako, 2007, Chu, 2009, 2010).
Recently, several models have been developed to address the issue of directed
technological change, in which technology is complementary to skilled or unskilled
workers (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002a, 2003, 2007, Thoenig and Verdier, 2003). We would
like to combine the literature on the optimal patent system and the one on directed
technological change in this paper. Consequently, we construct an endogenous growth
model to study the optimal patent system in the directed-technological-change econ-
omy and how the optimal patent system impacts the direction of technological change
and wage inequality, in which patents are classi￿ed as skill- and labor-complementary.
The ￿rst main results are: (1) Optimal patent breadth is ￿nite, and increases with
the quantity of skilled workers;15 (2) Optimal patent protection is skill-biased. The
basic idea is that the more skilled workers, the greater the economy of scale of skill-
complementary technology, and thus the more the dynamic bene￿ts of protection for
skill-complementary patent; (3) Skill-biased patent protection induces technological
change towards skills, thus increasing wage inequality. Therefore, based on the evi-
dence of an increased supply of skills over the past decades, the model provides an
interpretation for the following interesting questions: Why does the protection for
patents, in particular skill-complementary patents, increase? What is the impact of
skill-biased patent protection on wage inequality?
We show ￿rst that, in an open economy, international trade will induce skill-
biased patent protection, because opening trade increases the relative price of the
skill-intensive good, therefore increasing the relative dynamic bene￿ts of protection
for skill-complementary patents. Hence, the model can explain how globalization
in￿ uences the recent changes in patent systems worldwide. Then, in the tradition of
Acemoglu (2003), Neary (2002) and Theonig and Verdier (2003), we illustrate that
increased international trade could be a major cause of the increase in wage inequality
because it induces skill-biased technological change. The mechanism, however, is
15A number of studies have documented that the relative supply of skills have increased over the past decades
(see, for example, Acemoglu, 2002b, and references therein).
7di⁄erent. In Acemoglu￿ s paper, the main mechanism is that trade in ￿nal goods
increases the relative price of the skill-intensive good, thus encouraging technological
change towards skilled workers and increasing skill premia. Neary (2002), Thoenig
and Verdier (2003) show that free trade causes knowledge di⁄usion and increases
the possibilities of imitation, hence encouraging ￿rms to adopt defensive innovation
strategies to reinforce non-replication measures. This strategy leads to an increase
in the relative demand for skills, hence raising skill premia. The main mechanism
in this paper is that skill-biased patent protection and the market size e⁄ect induce
technological change towards skilled workers,16 thus increasing wage inequality.
The paper is related to Deardor⁄(1992), Maskus (2000), Yang and Maskus (2001),
Grossman and Lai (2004), among others. Deardor⁄(1992), Grossman and Lai (2004)
have argued that while the welfare of developed countries certainly rises with harmo-
nization of patent systems worldwide, that of developing countries may fall, and may
well fall by more than the increase in the welfare of the developed countries. Maskus
(2000) has stressed that in the short-term, global patent protection decreases the wel-
fare of developing countries, but it would bene￿t all countries in the long-run. Yang
and Maskus (2001) have pointed out that strong intellectual property rights in the
South promotes innovation in the North and technology transfer. In this paper, we
give attention to the e⁄ect of the harmonization of patent systems on wage inequality
in developing countries. It is shown that stronger protection of skill-complementary
patents, as forced by the U.S. and European countries after globalization, could be
a major cause of the increase in wage inequality in developing countries,17 since it
encourages skill bias of technology.
The related literature also includes Cozzi and Galli (2009) and Adams (2008).
Cozzi and Galli (2009) have stated that a strengthening of intellectual property
rights will lead to an increase in wage inequality. They focus on a closed-economy
quality-ladder model, whereas we consider a model with skill-biased technological
change. Adams (2008) have reported that strengthening intellectual property rights
and openness are positively correlated with income inequality in developing coun-
tries.
16The market size e⁄ect encourages the development of technologies that have a larger market. Actually, Acemoglu
(2002a) has shown that there are three forces determining the direction of technological change: the price e⁄ect, the
market size e⁄ect and the e⁄ect of innovation possibilities frontier. See Acemolgu￿ s paper for details.
17Many papers have shown that skill premia increase after globalization in many developing countries (see, for
example, Wood, 1997, Hason and Harrison, 1999, Attanasio et al., 2004).
83 The Model
We now develop a simple model to explore why the optimal patent protection is
skill-biased and how the skill-biased patent protection a⁄ects the degree of skill bias
of technology and wage inequality, in which patents are categorized as skill- and
labor-complementary.
3.1 The Environment
Consider an economy populated with H skilled workers and L unskilled workers, who
supply one unit labor inelastically.18 Representative consumers are with constant








where C(t) is consumption at time t, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (or
intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and ￿ is the subjective discount rate. We
drop the time index as long as this causes no confusion.
The budget constraint of the consumer is:










where I is investment, and R is total R&D expenditure. The production function in
(2) implies that output aggregate is de￿ned over a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) aggregate of a labor-intensive good, Yl, and a skill-intensive good, Yh. Para-
meter ￿ 2 [0;1) is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. When ￿ = 1,
the two goods are perfect substitutes, and the function is linear. When ￿ = 1, the
function is Cobb-Douglas. And when ￿ = 0, there is no substitution between the two
goods, and the production function is Leontie⁄.
Following Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2009), the labor-intensive good is produced from
unskilled workers and di⁄erent types of labor-complementary machines or interme-
diates, while the skill-intensive good is produced from skilled workers and a set of
di⁄erentiated skill-complementary machines. The key assumption is that none of
these machines are used by both types of workers. Speci￿cally, the production func-
tions of the skill-intensive and the labor-intensive good are as follows20:
18Endogenous skill acquisition will not change our qualitative results.
19In this paper, we assume 0 < ￿ < 1, because only in the this circumstance, an increase protection for patent has
the dynamic bene￿t and static cost as pointed out in Section 2.
20The main results are not altered when we assume that Yh = ￿
1￿￿
R Ah
















1￿￿ di ￿ L￿; (4)
where ￿ 2 (0;1), Az is the number of machines complementary to z, kz (i) is the quantity
of machines of variety i together with workers of skill level z, z = h or l. Indexes h
and l denote skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Z > 1 measures the relative
productivity of skilled workers. Consequently, ZH represents the e⁄ective amount of
skilled workers. The production functions in (3) and (4) exhibit constant returns to
scale in input factors: the double of labor and the quantity of all intermediate goods
doubles output. However, the production possibilities set of the economy will exhibit
increasing returns to scale because technological knowledge, Az, are endogenized.
Technological progress takes the form of the increase in Az over time. Using ￿
units of the ￿nal good, a ￿rm can develop a new variety of either type of machine.






where Xz denotes total output devoted to improving the technology complementary
to z = h or l. Equation (5) implies that with a total expenditure of X, there will be
X=￿ new varieties invented. For convenience, we assume the marginal cost for the
production of any machine is constant and equal to one unit of the ￿nal good.
A ￿rm that invents a machine obtains the protection granted by patent. As do
Goh and Oliver (2002), we assume that the life of a patent is in￿nite and we focus
on the issue of patent breadth. Following Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Diwan and
Rodrick (1991), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003), we de￿ne patent breadth as the
ability of the patentee to raise the prices for the patented goods over the lifetime of
patent. Strong protection granted by the patent increases the number of substitute
products that infringe on the patent or raises the costs of imitation, thus allowing
the patentee to raise prices. In particular, the prices charged by ￿rms producing the









where ￿h 6= ￿l will not change our main results.
10￿z (i) = ￿z = 1 + ￿z; z = h or l; (6)
where ￿z is the measure of patent breadth. The bigger the ￿z, the greater the patent
breadth. Using some algebra, we know that the monopoly price maximizing the
pro￿ts of patent products is 1
1￿￿. Therefore, ￿z ￿ ￿
1￿￿, and patent breadth is in￿nite
as equality holds.
3.2 Equilibrium
Taking advantage of (3), (4) and (6), we obtain the quantity of machines comple-
mentary to skilled and unskilled workers:
kh (i) = [ph=(1 + ￿h)]
1=￿ ￿ ZH; (7)
and
kl (i) = [pl=(1 + ￿l)]
1=￿ ￿ L; (8)
where ph and pl are the prices of the skill-intensive and the labor-intensive good,
respectively. We normalize the price of consumption aggregate as one. Therefore,
the monopoly pro￿ts of any intermediate good used by skilled and unskilled workers
at time ￿ are:
￿h (￿) = ￿h [ph=(1 + ￿h)]
1=￿ ￿ ZH; (9)
and
￿l (￿) = ￿l [pl=(1 + ￿l)]
1=￿ ￿ L: (10)
It is simple to show that when ￿z < ￿
1￿￿,
@￿z(￿)
@￿z > 0 and when ￿z = ￿
1￿￿,
@￿z(￿)
@￿z = 0. This
implies that the monopoly pro￿ts of a new variety of machines increase with patent
breadth, and maximum extent of patent breadth makes the pro￿ts highest.









(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ AlL: (11)
The market for the skill-intensive and the labor-intensive good is competitive, thus


















This shows that when either the technology is highly skill-biased (high Ah=Al) or the
relative supply of skilled workers is great (high H=L), the relative supply of the skill-
intensive good is large and the relative price is low. The relatively strong protection
for the skill-complementary patent (high ￿h=￿l) leads to a decrease in the relative
demand for machines complementing skills, thus declining the relative supply of the
skill-intensive good and increasing the relative price.
Free-entry in the R&D business implies that the cost of invention, ￿, should be






t r(s)ds￿z(￿)d￿ = Vz; (13)
where r is the rental price of capital. It suggests that in the equilibrium the ￿ ow
pro￿ts from selling labor- and skill-complementary machines should be equal, i.e.,














Intuitively, the bigger the amount of skilled workers, the larger the market for skill-
complementary machines, thus the lower the relative price of the skill-intensive good




@￿z ￿ 0. This implies that the
stronger the protection for the skill-complementary patent, the larger the pro￿ts of
new invention complementing skills, thus the relative price of the skill-intensive good
has to be lower to make the ￿ ow pro￿ts of labor- and skill- complementary machines
equal.















By (2), (11) and (12), we know that the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers is 1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1). Thus, (15) shows that the relative degree
of skill bias of technology, Ah=Al, is determined by the relative factor supply and
the elasticity of substitution between the two factors, skilled and unskilled work-
ers. When ￿ > 1, i.e., when the two factors are gross substitutes, technological
change is towards skilled workers; while ￿ < 1, i.e., when the two factors are gross
12complements, technological change is unskilled-biased (skill-replacing).22 Almost all
estimates show an elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers
greater than 1, most likely greater than 1.4, and perhaps as large as 2, that is,
1 ￿ 1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 2 (see, for example, Freeman, 1986, Acemoglu, 2002b). Hence, we
take ￿ to be greater than 1 in the rest of the paper. In addition, using some alge-




@￿z > 0 as ￿z ￿ ￿
1￿￿. Therefore, the degree of skill
bias of technology, Ah=Al, rises with the breadth of the skill-complementary patent.
Strong protection for the skill-complementary patent results in an increase in the
pro￿ts selling skill-complementary machines, thus inducing skill-biased technological
change.








1￿￿ = 1 (16)

























Therefore, the price of the skill-intensive good is lower (and the price of the labor-
intensive good is higher) when the relative supply of skilled workers is larger or the
relative protection for the skill-complementary patent is stronger.
Maximization of utility function in (1), subject to a standard budget constraint,







(r ￿ ￿); (18)
It says that either the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is bigger or the discount
rate is smaller, the growth rate of consumption is higher.
Combining (9), (10), (13), (17) and (18), we obtain the equilibrium economic
growth rate:23
22When the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1, technological change is never biased towards skilled or unskilled
workers.
23The growth rate expression suggests that the parameters must be assumed to be such that g ￿ 0. Otherwise,
the constraint that Az cannot be decreasing would be violated, and the free-entry condition for R&D would not hold























@￿z ￿ 0, that is, strong patent protection increases the growth rate. This
denotes the dynamic bene￿ts of the patent system. Intuitively, great patent breadth
raises the pro￿ts of invention, thus inducing resources devoted to inventing technol-
ogy and a high growth rate. When there is a bigger amount of skilled (unskilled)
workers, the market for machines complementing skilled (unskilled) workers is larger,
hence the pro￿ts of invention are higher. Therefore, the growth rate increases with
the quantity of skilled and unskilled workers, i.e.,
@g
@H > 0 and
@g
@L > 0.
Now let us brie￿ y investigate the stability of the equilibrium. For given patent
breadth, according to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we know that o⁄ the balanced
growth path, there will only be one type of innovation. That is, if Vh=Vl > 1, only skill-
complementary innovation is taken place, and if Vh=Vl < 1, innovators only undertake
labor-complementary R&D. Clearly, when Ah=Al is lower than in (15), Vh=Vl > 1, and
vice versa when Ah=Al is too high. As a consequence, the transitional dynamics of
the economy are stable.24
3.3 Optimal Patent System





, there exists ￿
￿
z maximizing
social welfare.25 Output growth maximization, however, may not be equivalent to
welfare maximization. Therefore, in￿nite patent breadth, which maximizes the out-
put growth rate, is not optimal. Intuitively, when patent breadth is in￿nite, the







= 0), but the cost is
bigger than zero because of monopoly pricing. Hence, we state the following propo-
sition





Proof. See the Appendix.
24See Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) for a formal and detail proof.
25Maybe ￿￿
z is unique. However, the analysis is substantially complicated. Fortunately, the following results are
independent of whether ￿￿
z is singleton or not. Indeed, when ￿￿
z is not unique, it is reasonable to choose ￿￿
z that
maximizes the growth rate as the optimal patent breadth. Moreover, it is easy to know that
@U(￿h;￿l)
@￿z









14Propositions 1 shows that ￿nite patent breadth maximizes the social welfare level.
This result is similar to the results of many existing studies. For instance, Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990) have argued that narrow patent is optimal because broad patent
is costly for society in that it gives excessive monopoly power to the patent holder.
In recent decades, the relative quantity of skilled workers has increased sharply
in most developed countries. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous
paper investigating the impact of an increased supply of skills on the optimal patent
system.
Proposition 2 The more the quantity of (unskilled) skilled workers, the greater the
breadth of patent, that is,
@(￿z)
￿
@ZH > 0 and
@(￿z)
￿
@L > 0. Moreover, if the e⁄ective amount of
skilled workers is bigger (smaller) than the amount of unskilled workers, the optimal
breadth of the skill-complementary patent is broader (narrower) than that of the labor-
complementary patent, and if the e⁄ective amount of skilled workers is equal to the
amount of unskilled workers, the optimal breadth of the two types of patents is same.













Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. The more the supply of skilled workers, the
greater the economy of scale of knowledge complementing skilled workers, thus the
broader the breadth of the skill-complementary patent. That is,
@(￿h)
￿
@H > 0. Moreover,
the relative price of the labor-intensive good rises with the amount of skilled workers,
thus the economy of scale of knowledge complementing unskilled workers becomes








During recent decades, the supply of unskilled and skilled workers has increased
in developed countries, hence proposition 2 can provide an interpretation for why
protection for patents has been strengthened in developed countries. Moreover, it is
reasonable that before the 1980s the amount of the e⁄ective skilled workers is much
smaller than that of unskilled workers. Over past decades, the supply of skilled work-
ers has increased more than that of unskilled workers in developed countries. If the
amount of the e⁄ective skilled workers is greater than that of unskilled workers after
the 1980s, then this proposition predicts protection for skill-complementary patent
strengthens. Indeed, even if the amount of the e⁄ective skilled workers is still smaller
26When we take into account of the other di⁄erences in the production of the skill-intensive and the labor-intensive
good, even though ZH < L, ￿￿
h > ￿￿
l may hold. For example, if the production technology of the skill-intensive good




0 kh (i)1￿￿ di ￿ (ZH)￿ where ￿ > 1, then ￿1=￿ZH > L, ￿￿
h > ￿￿
l .
15than that of unskilled workers, the former is much close to the latter.27 In this cir-
cumstance, we can say protection for skill-complementary patent increases relatively
more. Thus this proposition can provide an explanation for why protection for skill-
complementary patent has risen substantially. Since there are less skilled workers in
developing countries, one implication of the proposition is that strengthening global
patent protection, with help from the United States and Europe, may decrease the
social welfare level of many developing countries.28
Proposition 2 implies that, theoretically, it is optimal to have di⁄erent patent pro-
tection for di⁄erent type of innovation. For instance, it will be bene￿cial to strengthen
protection for labor-complementary patent in developing countries, whereas it will be
better o⁄ to increase protection for skill-complementary patent in developed coun-
tries. Consequently, it may be time to consider whether or not patent rules that are
neutral to technologies in the real world are the best.
Taking advantage of (15) and proposition 2, we know that there are two mecha-
nisms causing skill-biased technological change, one standard, i.e., the large relative
amount of skilled workers induces skill-biased technological change via the market
size e⁄ect, another new, that is, it encourages technological change towards skills
through the e⁄ect of skill-biased patent protection.
As an important consequence of proposition 2, the patent protection is skill-biased.













@L > 0, respectively. This implies, at least in a neighborhood of the






























we￿ d like to claim that a relative increasing of skill workers will lead to a relatively
stronger protection towards skill-complementary patent. In the following analysis,
when we address the issue of the direction of patent protection, we will restrict our
attention to the case where ZH and L are close.
3.4 Discussion
As vast quantities of empirical papers have documented over past decades, there
has been an increase in wage inequality in most developed and developing countries.
27In recent years, the share of skilled workers in labor force is over 20 percent in OECD countries. Furthermore,
when L is su¢ ciently large, an increase in L increases ￿￿
l little, because optimal breadth is ￿nite. As a result, for a
small ZH
L , an increase in ZH






28The patent breadth determined in the decentralized equilibrium may be narrower than the social optimal patent
breadth. Therefore, strengthening gobal patent protection may increase the social welfare level of middle-income
countries.
16The standard explanation for this pattern is that technological change has been skill-
biased over this period. We argue here that skill-biased patent protection could be
another major cause.
Now let us ￿rst address the problem of wage inequality in developed countries.
















It suggests that skill premia are greater when either the relative price of the skill-
intensive good is higher or the technology is more skill-biased. Equation (20) also
says that when the impact of skill-biased patent protection on the direction of tech-
nological change is not considered, great protection for skill-complementary patent
reduces the demand for machines used by skilled workers, due to the high price, and
thus the marginal product of skilled workers (or wages) declines.
Combining (12), (15) and (20), we get the ratio of wages paid for skilled workers



















e⁄ect of skill-biased e⁄ect of skill-biased











becomes larger. As pointed out
in the above analysis, ￿z and
￿h









has enlarged over past decades. In this
circumstance, we state
Proposition 3 When ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1 > 0, skill-biased patent protection and technological
change lead to an increase in skill premia in developed countries.
The United States and Europe have been dissatis￿ed with the situation of weak
IPRs protection in many developing countries. Hence, they have tried to force
developing countries to increase the protection for patents, in particular for skill-
complementary patents after globalization. We will show that this will lead to an
increase in wage inequality in developing countries and then discuss the problem
17further in the context of an open economy.
Let us assume ZHN > LN in developed countries and ZHS < LS in developing
















Now if patent protection is harmonized all over the world and under pressures of























Comparing (22) and (23), we obtain the following proposition
Proposition 4 Harmonization of global patent protection increases wage inequality in
developing countries.
Intuitively, stronger protection of skill-complementary patents forced by the U.S.
and European countries induces skill-biased technological change, thus increasing
skill premia in developing countries.
4 International Trade, Skill-Biased Patent Protection and
Wage Inequality
We now explore the impact of international trade on the patent system and on wage
inequality. For this purpose, we consider a world economy consisting of two countries,
one a developed country and another a developing country. What distinguishes the
two countries is the abundance of skills. For simplicity, suppose that ZHN > LN and
ZHS < LS, i.e., the developed country is more abundant in skills.31
Producers in the developing country adopt machines invented in the developed
country. However, because these machines may not be appropriate to its need, the










, the main results remain unchanged.












h >  ￿N
l .
31The value of the skill-intensive good is larger than that of the labor-intensive good in many developed countries,
while the former is smaller than the latter in many developing countries. As a consequence, the assumption may be
reasonable.
18productivity in the developing country is proportional to the productivity in the




where ￿ ￿ 1.32 Furthermore, suppose that the developing country is forced to upgrade
its patent system to implement the most rudimentary rules for IPRs protection based
on the U.S. and EU practices under their pressures. Therefore, the monopoly prof-
its of skill-complementary machines and the ones of labor-complementary machines




























where o represents the open economy, and 0 < v = ￿￿
1=￿ ￿ 1, where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 suggests
that R&D ￿rms in the developed country can only seize the proportion of revenues
generated by machine sales in the developing country.33
In the balanced growth path (BGP), the ￿ ow pro￿ts from selling labor- and skill-
complementary machines should be equal, i.e., ￿o
h (￿) = ￿o


















































32If the cost of innovation is higher in the developing country than in the developed country, then when interna-
tional trade is considered, the former is likely to adopt machines from the latter, because the latter has comparative
advantage in innovation.
33Although developing countries are forced to upgrade patent protection, the degree of patent protection in
developing countries may still be lower than that in developed countries.


























Since HN=LN > HS=LS, ZH
N+￿ZH
S
LN+￿LS < HN=LN. Equations (28) and (29) suggest that,
all other things being equal, the price of the skill-intensive good increases, while the





The intuition that we use is straightforward. The relative pro￿tability of invention
complementing skills declines after opening-up, due to the relatively smaller quantity
of skill-complementary machines used in the developing country. Therefore, the price
of the skill-intensive good goes up to make ￿o
h (￿) = ￿o
l (￿) equal.


































Since international trade strengthens patent protection for machines invented in the
developed country, their pro￿ts increase. Therefore, more resources are devoted to
inventing machines in the developed country. This implies the increase in the world
growth rate.






@￿z, namely, opening-up increases
dynamic bene￿ts of patent protection in the developed country. Hence, free trade
will result in greater protection for patents. Summarizing the foregoing analysis and
using proposition 2, we state







We omit the straightforward proof of the proposition, and center our attention
on an extended application of the skill-biased patent protection arguments below
proposition 2. If we replace the increments ￿ZHS and ￿LS by ￿1ZHS and ￿2LS ,





LN , the trade will impact the












l . Therefore, free trade






36Since the developed country exports the skill-intensive good and imports labor-intensive good, it will strengthen
the protection for skill-complementary patent to gain bene￿ts from trade. In this sense, globalization results in
skill-biased patent protection.
20Now we address the problem of wage inequality in the open economy. After trade
openness all consumers in the world face the same relative price and will have the
same relative consumption of the skill-intensive good and the labor-intensive good.



















































e⁄ect of skill-biased market size e⁄ect
patent protection
On the one hand, open trade encourages skill-biased patent protection, thus inducing
invention complementary to skills. On the other hand, trade openness declines the





LN ), thus inducing skill-
replacing technological change. Therefore, whether free trade induces skill-biased
technological change depends on the relative strengths of the two e⁄ects.


































































The intuition is straightforward. When ￿ ￿ b ￿, free trade encourages skill-biased
patent protection, thus inducing inventions complementary to skills and an increase
in wage inequality. In addition, international trade results in an increase in the rela-
tive price of the skill-intensive good, and therefore skill premia increase. Summarizing
the foregoing analysis, we state











































By proposition 5 and (34), it is obvious that when ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿1 > 0, free trade leads to












we state the following proposition:
Proposition 7 When ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1 > 0, international trade increases skill premia in the
developing country.
Intuitively, free trade encourages skill-biased patent protection, thus stimulating
inventions complementary to skills and an increase in wage inequality in the devel-
oping country.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a simple model has been constructed to explore the optimal patent
system in the directed-technological-change economy and the impact of the optimal
patent system on the direction of technological change and wage inequality, in which
patent is categorized as skill- and labor-complementary. We show that: (1) Optimal
patent breadth is ￿nite, and rises with the quantity of skilled workers; (2) An increase
in the amount of skilled workers increases the protection for the skill-complementary
patent, i.e., optimal patent protection is skill-biased; (3) Skill-biased patent protec-
tion increases wage inequality by encouraging skill-biased technological change; (4)
Free trade leads to a strong protection for patents, especially for skill-complementary
patents, thus increasing skill premia.
The United States and Europe are dissatis￿ed with the inadequate protection
of IPRs in developing countries, hence they strongly encourage many developing
countries to enforce skill-biased patent systems. We show that greater protection for
skill-complementary patents, implemented under pressures from the United States
and Europe countries after globalization could be a major cause of the increase in
wage inequality in developing countries, since it encourages skill-biased technological
change.
22However, it must be stressed that we relied on the strong assumption of in￿nite
patent life to obtain unambiguous results. The obvious next issue on the research
agenda is to check the robustness of our results to departures from the assumption.
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27Table 1: Number of Software Patents
Successful Patent
Patents Issued Applications
Software Total Utility Software/ Software Total Utility
Patents Patents Total (%) Patents Patents
1976 765 70,226 1.1 853 65,804
1977 884 65,269 1.4 1,094 65,978
1978 897 66,102 1.4 1,170 65,601
1979 795 48,854 1.6 1,439 65,726
1980 1,080 61,819 1.7 1,633 66,491
1981 1,275 65,771 1.9 1,821 63,910
1982 1,402 57,888 2.4 2,233 65,009
1983 1,443 56,860 2.5 2,297 61,563
1984 1,939 67,200 2.9 2,641 67,071
1985 2,453 71,661 3.4 2,924 71,442
1986 2,657 70,860 3.7 3,482 75,088
1987 3,530 82,952 4.3 4,055 81,458
1988 3,495 77,924 4.5 4,841 90,134
1989 4,974 95,537 5.2 5,755 96,077
1990 4,704 90,364 5.2 6,471 99,254
1991 5,347 96,513 5.5 7,091 100,016
1992 5,862 97,444 6.0 8,149 103,307
1993 6,756 98,342 6.9 9,459 106,848
1994 8,031 101,676 7.9 12,251 120,380
1995 9,000 101,419 8.9 16,617 137,661
1996 11,359 109,645 10.4 17,085 131,450
1997 12,262 111,983 10.9 13,087 114,881
1998 19,355 147,519 13.1
1999 20,385 153,486 13.3
2000 21,065 157,595 13.4
2001 23,406 166,158 14.1
2002 24,981 167,438 14,9
Source: Bessen and Hunt (2007)
28Table 2: Number of Business Method Patents
Patents Issued
Business Method Total Utility Business Method /
Patents Patents Total (%)
1988 83 78,333 1.1
1989 128 96,011 1.4
1990 100 90,877 1.4
1991 95 96,918 1.6
1992 89 97,921 1.7
1993 164 98,815 1.9
1994 171 102,109 2.4
1995 119 101,855 2.5
1996 155 110,032 2.9
1997 247 112,338 3.4
1998 493 147,876 3.7
1999 719 153,984 4.3
2000 729 158,119 4.5
2001 480 166,584 5.2
2002 451 167,833 5.2
2003 431 169,475 5.5
2004 312 164,607 6.0
2005 775 144,070 6.9
2006 1,260 174,316 7.9
2007 1168 157,812 8.9
2008 1,692 158,424 10.4
Source: USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/o¢ ces/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf.
29Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: As in most of literature, we assume the economy is in its BGP





where ￿h = (1+￿h)￿￿1(￿hZH)￿(1￿￿) and ￿l = (1+￿l)￿￿1(￿lL)￿(1￿￿). In order to investigate
whether the optimal patent protection ￿
￿
z is ￿nite or not, we have to compute the
utility of a representative agent in the equilibrium. From (1), the discounted sum of
utility could be written as, for 0 < ￿ < 1,
U(￿h;￿l) =
C(0)1￿￿






C(0) = phYh(0) + plYl(0) ￿ Ah(0)kh(0) ￿ Al(0)kl(0) ￿ ￿gAh(0) ￿ ￿gAl(0) (A3)
denotes the agent￿ s consumption. Since the amount of initial total capital, Ah(0)kh(0)+
Al(0)kl(0), should be taken as given, thus
@ (Ah(0)kh(0) + Al(0)kl(0))
@ ￿z
= 0: (A4)
From (19), the in￿nite patent breadth ￿z = ￿






























30By (11) and (A1), direct computation on (A3) gives
C(0) =

























@ ￿h j￿z= ￿






















































1￿￿ holds, that is, the patent breadth maximizing social welfare is ￿nite.
Proof of Proposition 2: The economy is assumed to be in its BGP. By (A3), when
Al(0) is ￿xed, we consider the utility U(￿z) as a function with parametric variables H
and L, and rewrite it as U(￿z;H;L). Let ￿
￿
z(￿) be the ￿nite optimal patent breadth in






For ￿xed Az(0) and ￿z, C(0) increases as a function of ￿. Otherwise, we can ￿nd
a su¢ cient large ￿ such that C(0;￿) < 0, which is impossible. Since the more the
workers are, the higher the growth rate g is, we obtain, for ￿ > 1,
C(0;￿)
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)g(￿)
>
C(0)




































































































and the following long identity
￿
(1 + ￿l)(1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿h)








l (1 ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ￿l)L￿(￿￿1)
￿
(￿￿g + ￿￿)1+￿(￿￿1)(1 ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ￿h)




After a simple algebra, we know that when H is enlarged and ￿z is given, the right




@Z H > 0. In addition, when ZH = L, (A10) implies
(￿￿g + ￿￿)1+￿(￿￿1)(1 ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ￿h)








@ZH > 0 suggests that
(￿￿g+￿￿)
1+￿(￿￿1)
￿g is an increasing
function of g. Therefore, when L increases and ￿z is given, the right hand of (A10)



























ZH = (1 + ￿)ZH and L = (1 ￿ &)ZH where ￿ ! 0+, & ! 0+ and (1 + ￿)
￿(￿￿1)+(1 ￿ &)
￿(￿￿1) =
2, and that patent protection remains unchanged. Then, the growth rate remains the





l plYl (0) ￿




Al(0). Therefore, (A3) says that when ZH = (1 + ￿)ZH and L = (1 ￿ &)ZH, if ￿z = ￿
￿
z,
then C (0) goes up. This means that in order to increase utility, patent protec-
tion should be adjusted to increase the growth rate. Using (A11), we know that








@L . Thus, some algebra implies that for ￿(￿ ￿ 1) >
320, ￿
￿
h ((1 + ￿)ZH;(1 ￿ &)ZH) > ￿
￿
h (ZH;ZH) and ￿
￿





h ((1 + ￿)ZH;(1 ￿ &)ZH) < ￿
￿
h (ZH;ZH) and ￿
￿
l ((1 + ￿)ZH;(1 ￿ &)ZH) > ￿
￿
l (ZH;ZH)
are satis￿ed. Suppose the latter two inequalities hold. Then, ￿
￿
h ((1 + ￿)ZH;(1 ￿ &)ZH)+
￿
￿
l ((1 + ￿)ZH;(1 ￿ &)ZH) > ￿
￿
h (ZH;ZH) + ￿
￿

















@ZH when ZH = L, this inequality cannot
hold. Thus, inequalities ￿
￿
h ((1 + ￿)ZH;(1 ￿ &)ZH) > ￿
￿
h (ZH;ZH) and ￿
￿
l ((1 + ￿)ZH;(1 ￿ &)ZH) <
￿
￿


















symmetry, the following two equations should be satis￿ed
￿
(1 + ￿l)(1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿h)








l (1 ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ￿l)L￿(￿￿1)
￿
(￿￿g + ￿￿)1+￿(￿￿1)(1 ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ￿h)






(1 + ￿l)(1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿h)








l (1 ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ￿l)(g ZH)￿(￿￿1)
￿
(￿￿g + ￿￿)1+￿(￿￿1)(1 ￿ 1￿￿
￿ ￿h)




Clearly, when (A12) and (A13) cannot hold simultaneously. Therefore, we get a









when ZH < L, ￿
￿
h < ￿
￿
l.
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